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INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 severely limits the government’s ability
to offer evidence of a defendant’s character trait of violence to prove action
in conformity with that trait on the occasion in question.1 The Rule states
that such character evidence is generally inadmissible when offered to
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1. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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prove propensity.2 The Rule also allows the government to offer evidence
of an alleged victim’s character for peacefulness in homicide cases where
the defendant asserts the self-defense privilege.3 Although criminal de-
fendants may offer character evidence under limited circumstances, Rule
404 creates a significant disincentive for doing so. Where a defendant offers
evidence of an alleged victim’s character trait to prove action in conform-
ity therewith, this decision not only opens the door for the prosecution to
offer positive character evidence on behalf of the victim but it also allows
the prosecutor to offer bad character evidence against the defendant.4 Sim-
ilarly, if the government offers evidence of a homicide victim’s character
for nonviolence to rebut a claim of self-defense, doing so opens the door
to the introduction of the victim’s bad character evidence.5
Now, consider the widely held stereotype or belief that African-
Americans are inherently violent.6 Scholars sometimes deem beliefs or bi-
ases like this one to be “implicit” in that they often exist on a subconscious
level.7 The individuals who harbor such biases may not even know they
are doing so.8 The implicit belief that African-Americans are inherently
violent can be used as both a sword and a shield in a trial concerning a
violent criminal act. Rather than offering inadmissible evidence of a Black
defendant’s character for violence, the government can instead offer evi-
dence of the defendant’s stereotypical Blackness, thereby playing upon the
jurors’ implicit biases to establish the guilt of the defendant. Likewise, a
non-Black defendant need not offer evidence of a Black victim’s violent
character to support a claim of self-defense. Rather, the victim’s stere-
otypical Blackness is sufficient character evidence. Because stereotypical
Blackness implies a propensity for violence (among other character traits),
a non-Black defendant can benefit from this character evidence without
having to take the risk that his or her own violent past might be offered at
trial. The State v. George Zimmerman9 trial is a recent example of this
strategy.10
While most scholars acknowledge the existence of certain stereotypes
and biases against African-Americans and even recognize that those biases
may have an impact on our justice system, the covert and silent nature of
implicit biases makes them more difficult to ferret out. How can a trial
2. Id.
3. Id. at (a)(2)(C).
4. See discussion, infra Section I.A.2.
5. Id.
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Courts, State v. Zimmerman, No. 2012-CF-001083-A,
http://www.flcourts18.org/page.php?129 (media advisories and public record documents per-
taining to the trial) (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
10. State v. Zimmerman is discussed in greater detail in Section III.
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judge successfully stop jurors from considering certain racial stereotypes
when many of the jurors do not realize that they harbor those racial stereo-
types? This Article will explore solutions that may serve to eliminate or
rebut the unspoken evidence that is often at play when African-Americans
navigate through our justice system. Part I of the Article will focus on the
development of the Federal Rule of Evidence that prohibits the use of
propensity evidence to prove action in conformity therewith. Part II of the
Article will define the concepts of implicit bias and transparency phenom-
enon and explore how those concepts can come together to create evi-
dence of stereotypical Blackness. Part III of the Article will discuss the use
of Blackness as character evidence in the State v. George Zimmerman
trial. Lastly, Part IV of the Article will analyze possible solutions that may
eliminate jurors’ consideration of evidence of stereotypical Blackness or at
least reduce its probative value.
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(A) AND ITS RATIONALE
A. The Rule
Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 404(a) states:
Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or char-
acter trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case.
The following exceptions apply in a criminal case:
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant’s perti-
nent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may
offer evidence to rebut it;
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may
offer evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait, and if the
evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may:
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant’s same trait; and
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of
the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor.
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness’s character
may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.11
Subsection (1) of the Rule articulates the general prohibition against
the use of propensity evidence to prove action in conformity with a given
11. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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character trait. For example, if Donald the Defendant were on trial for
assault and battery against Victor the Victim, Rule 404(a)(1) would gener-
ally prohibit the prosecution from offering evidence, through either repu-
tation or opinion testimony, that Donald is a violent person.12 Subsection
(2) states two exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of propen-
sity evidence. In the context of criminal cases only, the defendant may
offer evidence of any relevant character trait. For example, Donald may
choose to offer reputation or opinion testimony that demonstrates his
peaceful character; however, if he does so, he invites the prosecution to
rebut his evidence of peacefulness with evidence of his violent character.
The defendant may also offer evidence of the victim’s relevant character
trait subject to Rule 412, the rape shield law.13 For example, Donald may
offer evidence, through opinion and reputation testimony, that Victor is a
violent person; however, if Donald offers this character evidence, then he
“opens the door” or makes admissible any evidence demonstrating Victor’s
character for peacefulness or Donald’s character for violence.14 Moreover,
in a homicide case where the defendant has asserted the self-defense privi-
lege, the prosecution may offer evidence of the alleged victim’s peaceful
character to rebut the defendant’s claim that the victim was the first aggres-
sor.15 Finally, subsection (3) provides that evidence of a witness’s character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be admissible pursuant to Rules
607, 608, and 609.16
12. To the extent the Rule would allow for such evidence (typically when offered to
prove something other than action in conformity therewith), Rule 405 would require the prose-
cution to offer the character evidence through opinion or reputation testimony rather than
through testimony regarding specific prior acts. See FED. R. EVID. 405 (stating that character
evidence related to prior acts may only be explored on cross-examination or where the defen-
dant’s character trait is an essential element of the charge, claim, or defense).
13. The rape shield law generally prohibits evidence of an alleged victim’s prior sexual
behavior or sexual predisposition in a civil or criminal trial involving allegations of sexual mis-
conduct. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a). In a criminal case involving allegations of sexual misconduct,
a defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim’s prior sexual behavior to prove that another
individual was the source of any physical evidence or that the alleged victim and the defendant
had engaged in consensual sex in the past. Id. at 412(b). Finally, a criminal defendant may offer
such evidence if the exclusion of the evidence would violate the defendant’s constitutional
rights. Id.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(C).
16. Rule 607 provides that any party may impeach a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 607.
Rule 608 states that evidence of a witness’s character for untruthfulness may be offered through
opinion or reputation testimony and that a witness’s character for truthfulness may be offered
only after the witness’s credibility has been attacked. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a). Rule 608 also
prohibits the parties from establishing a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
through extrinsic evidence of prior acts; however, the Rule does allow the witness to be cross-
examined concerning prior acts relevant to his or her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Id. at 608(b). Rule 609 provides that, in a criminal case, a non-defendant witness’s character for
truthfulness may be attacked using evidence of a felony conviction where the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. With regard to a
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1. The Rationale Supporting the Prohibition
Today, Rule 404(a) prohibits the use of propensity evidence to prove
action in conformity therewith despite the fact that an individual’s prior
behavior carries some probative value. F.R.E.  401 defines relevant evi-
dence as evidence having “any tendency to make a fact more or less proba-
ble than it would be without the evidence.”17 Thus, if Donald, the
defendant in our hypothetical assault and battery trial, has a general reputa-
tion in his community as a violent, aggressive, and confrontational person,
his reputation would be relevant evidence in his current trial because it
increases the likelihood that he committed the assault and battery with
which he is charged. Despite the obvious relevance of the evidence, Rule
404(a) calls for its exclusion in an effort to preserve the presumption of
innocence.18 The prohibition against the government’s use of propensity
evidence is a corollary to the presumption of innocence in that no such
presumption can exist if the defendant is proven guilty using evidence of
his or her violent nature.19
Another justification for the prohibition against propensity evidence
can be found in Rule 403, which calls for the exclusion of evidence where
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.20 Rule 404(a)’s prohibition against propensity evidence likely
reflects the drafters’ application of Rule 403’s balancing test. Thus, despite
the probative value of propensity evidence, the danger of unfair prejudice
associated with such evidence will always outweigh its probative value, at
least when the evidence is offered by the government to establish that the
defendant acted in conformity with his or her character trait on the occa-
sion in question.
The unfair prejudice associated with propensity evidence is varied.
Most obviously, there is a risk that the jury will conclude that the defen-
defendant-witness, the felony conviction is admissible if the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect in any respect. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
17. FED. R. EVID. 401(a). Subsection (a) of Rule 401 indicates that the evidence must
have probative value in establishing a certain fact, while subsection (b) states that the fact estab-
lished by the evidence must be material or “of consequence in determining the action.” Id. at
401(a)-(b).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of propensity evidence in order to
prevent jurors from using a defendant’s character to assess whether he or she is guilty of the
crime charged).
19. See Coleman v. People, 55 N.Y. 81, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1873) (“It would be easier to
believe a person guilty of one crime if it was known that he had committed another of a similar
character, or, indeed, of any character; but the injustice of such a rule in courts of justice is
apparent. It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts in
no way connected with it, and to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction for a
single one.”).
20. FED. R. EVID. 403. The advisory committee notes following Rule 403 define unfair
prejudice as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one.” FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
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dant has a “proclivity for criminality” and thereby assume that the defen-
dant acted in conformity with that character trait on the relevant
occasion.21 Similarly, the jury may conclude that because the individual
exhibited a particular character trait in the past, he or she must have also
done so on the occasion in question. Essentially, the jury may conclude,
“If she did it before, she’ll do it again.” Another risk is that the jury will
convict in order to punish the defendant for his or her prior crimes, even
where the government has failed to prove that the defendant committed
the crime with which he or she is charged.22 In this instance, the evidence
should be excluded due to the risk that the jury may use the evidence to
make a decision based on emotion or passion.23
2. The Exceptions to the Prohibition Against the Use of
Propensity Evidence
Despite the risks discussed above, Rule 404(a)(2), called the “mercy
rule” by some scholars,24 allows for the admissibility of propensity evi-
dence in criminal cases where: (1) the defendant offers evidence of his or
her pertinent character trait; (2) the defendant offers evidence of an alleged
victim’s pertinent character trait subject to the rape shield law; or (3) the
government in a homicide case offers evidence of an alleged victim’s char-
acter trait of peacefulness to rebut a claim of self-defense.25 In each of these
scenarios, the party against whom the evidence is offered may rebut the
evidence with additional propensity evidence.26
The 404(a)(2) exceptions exist for several reasons. First, unlike nega-
tive propensity evidence that might be offered against a defendant by the
government, positive propensity evidence, when offered by the accused, is
not likely to result in unfair prejudice.27 For example, if our defendant
Donald offers evidence to establish his peaceful character to show that he
21. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 672 (John W. Strong et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1999).
22. See State v. Kerby, 118 P.3d 740, 747 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that evidence of
prior bad acts or convictions “may unfairly prejudice a defendant by emotionally predisposing
the jury against the defendant”).
23. See United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Even if the evidence
does not create unfair prejudice solely because it rests on propensity, it may still risk a decision on
the basis of something like passion or bias—that is, an improper basis.”); see also FED. R. EVID.
404 (advisory committee’s note) (stating that propensity evidence “‘subtly permits the trier of
fact to reward the good man [and] to punish the bad man because of their respective characters
despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.’” (quoting Tentative Recommenda-
tion and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, CAL. L. REV. COMM’N, REP., RECOM-
MENDATION & STUD. 615 (1964))).
24. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Justice of the Peace? Why Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C)
Should be Repealed, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (2013).
25. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
26. Id.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (advisory committee’s notes).
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did not assault Victor on the occasion in question, there is very little risk
that the jury will give too much weight to this evidence by acquitting
Donald in spite of evidence that clearly establishes his guilt. If Rule 403’s
balancing test is applied to a defendant’s positive character evidence, the
probative value of the evidence would not be substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. Similarly, evidence of an alleged victim’s
peaceful character would not result in unfair prejudice to the defendant,
especially when offered to rebut the defendant’s claim that the victim was
the first aggressor.
Second, Rule 404(a)(2)’s exceptions are as much a part of the Ameri-
can legal tradition as the prohibition against propensity evidence itself.28
The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee noted that Rule
404(a)(2)’s exceptions were “so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as
to assume almost constitutional proportions and to override doubts of the
basic relevancy of the evidence.”29 The Committee’s decision to codify
the 404(a)(2) exceptions decreases the risk that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation or due process rights might be violated.30
Finally, the Rule 404(a)(2)(A) and (B) exceptions may exist simply to
provide additional assistance to criminal defendants. The exceptions likely
reflect the drafters’ decision “to allow the criminal defendant with so
much at stake and so little available in the way of conventional proof to
have special dispensation to tell the fact-finder just what sort of person he
really is.”31
While Rule 404(a) limits the admissibility of character evidence of-
fered against defendants or alleged victims, my hypothesis is that the appli-
cation of implicit bias, transparency theory, and racial stereotypes creates
an alternative method for offering propensity evidence that might other-
wise be inadmissible or quite risky if offered pursuant to the Rule. With
the overall framework and rationale supporting Rule 404(a) in mind, I will
now explore the concepts of implicit bias and transparency theory and




30. Cf. Miller, supra note 24 (noting that “[i]t could be said that a court precluding a
defendant from presenting evidence of the victim’s character for violence similarly deprives the
defendant of his right to confrontation.” Furthermore, the preclusion of such evidence or evi-
dence of the defendant’s good character could deprive the defendant of his right to present a
defense or his right to due process. Miller also notes that, while 404(a)(2)(A) and (B) provide
additional tools for a criminal defendant, 404(a)(2)(C) “is a windfall for the government, al-
lowing it to prove the victim’s character for peacefulness even without the defendant asserting
that the victim was generally a violent person. It thus subverts the general understanding that the
Constitution is designed to protect the people from the government rather than the other way
around.”).
31. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and Injustice in
the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 855 (1982).
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II. IMPLICIT BIAS, TRANSPARENCY THEORY AND RACIAL
STEREOTYPES AGAINST AFRICAN-AMERICANS
In order to fully understand the manner in which common stereo-
types of African-Americans take on the role of character evidence at trial,
it is important to explore two concepts that, in my opinion, are at play
whenever a criminal case involves an African-American defendant or vic-
tim—implicit bias and transparency theory.
A. Implicit Bias
A great deal of social science research and legal scholarship has fo-
cused on the concept of implicit bias. According to Judge Mark W. Ben-
nett,32 who has researched the effect of implicit bias on jurors, implicit
biases are “the plethora of fears, feelings, perceptions, and stereotypes that
lie deep within our subconscious, without our conscious permission or
acknowledgement.”33 Unlike explicit biases, which are open, overt, and
generally disavowed by society, implicit biases exist on a subconscious
level. As a result, we often act based on our implicit biases without any
awareness that we harbor them.34 Social scientists believe that we develop
implicit biases due to “repeated negative associations—such as the associa-
tion of a particular race with crime—that establish neurological responses
in the area of the brain responsible for detecting and quickly responding to
danger.”35 Thus, with regard to African-Americans, implicit biases are
likely formed due to an institutionalized narrative in our society that
Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites, inherently violent, and more
likely to commit crimes than Whites.36
32. Bennett is a U.S. District Court judge for the Northern District of Iowa. See U.S.
District Court, Northern District of Iowa, Judges Information, http://www.iand.uscourts.gov/
e-web/home.nsf/0/17a5762715fa4c52862573c90079072c?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 12,
2015).
33. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, The Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 (2010).
34. Id. at 150 (“I have discovered that we unconsciously act on implicit biases even
though we abhor them when they come to our attention.”).
35. Id. at 152.
36. See R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit
Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2006) (“Psychologists have docu-
mented and explored the longstanding stereotype of African Americans as violent and prone to
criminality. Indeed, this is the stereotype most commonly applied to Blacks - or at least to young
Black males.” (citing Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?
The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995) and PAUL
M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 43-45 (1993))).
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1. The Implicit Association Test
The most well-known and highly regarded measure of implicit bias is
the Harvard Implicit Association Test (“IAT”).37 Developed by researchers
from Harvard University and the University of Washington in the 1990s,
the IAT attempts to measure various types of biases, including biases based
on race, gender, age, disability, and religion.38 The IAT’s methodology has
been analyzed over the years, and the scientific community has generally
found the test to be a valid measure of implicit bias.39
Currently, fourteen IATs are available on the Internet, including a
Race IAT.40 The Race IAT seeks to measure whether participants hold an
implicit bias against African-Americans.41 Data collected from the Race
IAT indicate that approximately 88 percent of White Americans harbor
some level of implicit bias against African-Americans.42 Interestingly, the
data also indicate that 48 percent of African-Americans show a bias in
37. See Banks, Eberhardt & Ross, supra note 36, at 1182. See also Anthony G. Greenwald,
Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
38. Various IATs can be found on the Project Implicit website. Project Implicit, https://
implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
39. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509-11 (2005) (citing to
various scientific studies that have found the IAT to be methodologically sound). See also Jerry
Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV.
465, 477-81 (2010) [hereinafter Seeing Through Colorblindness].
40. See Project Implicit, supra note 38. The 14 IATs available on the website are: Race
IAT, Weapons IAT, Skin Tone IAT, Asian IAT, Weight IAT, Religion IAT, Sexuality IAT, Age
IAT, Gender-Career IAT, Arab-Muslim IAT, Disability IAT, Gender-Science IAT, Native IAT,
and Presidents IAT. Id.
41. Judge Bennett provides the following basic description of the IAT:
The IAT pairs an “attitude object” (such as a racial group) with an “evaluative
dimension” (such as “good” or “bad”) and suggests that the speeds of responses to
the association of the two shows automatic attitudes and stereotypes, that is, im-
plicit biases. “The IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find
it easier to associate pleasant words with [European American] faces and names
than with African American faces and names—and that the same pattern will be
found for other traditionally disadvantaged groups.” In other words, implicit bias
against African Americans is shown when “African American” is more rapidly
paired with “bad” than with “good.” Attributes that are associated with some
feature are easier and faster to pair than attributes that are not associated. Once the
test is completed, you receive ratings like “slight,” “moderate,” or “strong” as a
measure of your implicit bias on the subject tested.
Bennett, supra note 33, at 153 (quoting Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit
Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 971 (2008)).
42. See Maia Svalavitz, The Authentic Self: How Do You Know If You’re ‘Really’ Racist or
Sexist?, TIME (Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://healthland.time.com/2010/10/11/seeking-the-
authentic-self-how-do-you-know-if-youre-really-racist-or-sexist/ (citing data collected from
IAT results).
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favor of White Americans.43 While these statistics are startling, they should
not be read to suggest that 88 percent of Whites and 48 percent of Blacks
hold racist attitudes toward African-Americans; however, several scientific
studies have found that IAT results are at least a moderate predictor of
behavior.44 Thus, in some instances, individuals who hold implicit biases
against African-Americans may act upon those biases when engaging in
decision-making, including decisions related to guilt or innocence.
2. Juror Bias
For many years, social scientists and legal scholars have asserted that
White jurors are biased against African-Americans. Professor Sheri Lynn
Johnson argues that the race of a witness has a direct impact on whether
jurors will find the witness to be credible.45 Johnson asserts that race influ-
ences jurors’ credibility assessments in large part due to the history of race
relations in the United States.46 According to Johnson, race may improp-
erly influence credibility determinations even for White fact-finders “who
do not seem to manifest any animosity, racial or otherwise, toward African
American litigants.”47 Similarly, legal scholars have argued that jurors are
less likely to make accurate lie-detecting assessments of witnesses who are
of a different race.48 According to one scholar, White jurors’ inability to
make accurate credibility judgments for African-American witnesses and
defendants may explain the high number of wrongful convictions of Afri-
can-American defendants.49
Empirical evidence supports the existence of White juror bias against
African-Americans.50 A study conducted by Professors Samuel Sommers
and Phoebe Ellsworth revealed that White jurors are more likely to be
biased against African-American defendants and that this bias is more likely
to be present in cases where race is not made salient, or openly discussed,
at trial.51 In another study, Professor Justin Levinson found that implicit
43. Id.
44. Seeing Through Colorblindness, supra note 39, at 488 (stating that a meta-analysis of 122
scientific studies involving 14,900 subjects revealed a correlation between IAT results and behav-
ior, social judgments, and social action).
45. Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 261, 275 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 265.
48. See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection and the Jury, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Samuel Sommers & Phoebe Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSY., PUB. POL. & THE LAW 201
(2001) [hereinafter White Juror Bias].
51. See id. at 202; see also infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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racial bias affects jurors’ recall of relevant case facts.52 He noted that “par-
ticipants who read about an African-American story character were signifi-
cantly more likely to remember aggressive facts from the story than
participants who read about a Caucasian story character. Other results in-
dicated that these racial memory biases were not related to explicit racial
preferences.”53 This research provides further support for the notion that,
in today’s “post-racial” society where Whites largely disavow explicit ex-
pressions of racial bias, juror bias against African-Americans likely exists on
a subconscious level.
B. Transparency Theory
While White jurors may be influenced by their implicit biases when
acting as fact-finders in criminal cases involving African-Americans, they
may be equally affected by a doctrine called “transparency theory.”54
Coined by Professor Barbara Flagg, a Caucasian woman, the term “trans-
parency theory” or “transparency phenomenon” is defined as “the ten-
dency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors,
experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific.”55 Flagg argues that
Whites possess a significant societal privilege in that they do not often have
to think of themselves in terms of their race.56 Instead, Whites externalize
race, only reflecting on their Whiteness when comparing themselves to
people of color.57 Flagg posits that Whites are usually unconscious of their
Whiteness because it is the racial norm, while people of color are racially
distinctive and therefore a departure from the norm.58 Flagg states that,
“[T]o be white is not think about it.”59 For these reasons, Whiteness is “a
transparent quality when whites interact with whites in the absence of
people of color.”60
At first glance, it would seem that Whites’ failure to recognize their
Whiteness should be of no consequence to African-Americans; however,
Flagg’s next proposition should create great concern for African-Ameri-
cans involved in criminal trials. According to Flagg, because Whites are
not conscious of their Whiteness in most circumstances, they are similarly
not conscious of certain White-specific norms that they (and society as a
52. Justin Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking and Misremem-
bering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007).
53. Id.
54. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Require-
ment of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 970.
58. See id. at 970-71.
59. Id. at 969.
60. Flagg, supra note 54, at 970.
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whole) impose upon non-Whites.61 Whites mistakenly believe these
White-specific norms are racially neutral and will accordingly make deci-
sions and judgments based on non-Whites’ ability or willingness to assimi-
late to these norms.62 When non-Whites fail to act in accordance with
these White-specific norms, they may face discrimination at the hands of
well-intentioned Whites.63 Flagg notes that “[t]ransparency operates to
require black assimilation even when pluralism is the articulated goal; it
affords substantial advantages to whites over blacks even when deci-
sionmakers intend to effect substantive racial justice.”64 I believe that a
Black person’s failure to assimilate to certain White-specific norms results
in a conclusion by Whites that the African-American has a propensity for
engaging in stereotypically Black behavior. Moreover, in the context of a
criminal case, an African-American who fails to assimilate to White-spe-
cific norms will likely face affirmative evidence of stereotypical Blackness
including evidence that he or she has a propensity for engaging in certain
behavior.
Professor Flagg provides an example of the application of the trans-
parency phenomenon: She describes a real-life story of Black woman who
is seeking a seat on the Board of Directors of a public interest organiza-
tion.65 The woman has owned her own business for eleven years, and it
grosses $700,000 annually.66 She employs ten people in addition to her-
self.67 The woman dropped out of high school at the age of sixteen and
later obtained her high school equivalency diploma.68 She did not attend
college but instead started her own business.69 The committee considering
the woman’s candidacy is predominantly White.70 During the woman’s
interview with the committee members, several of them question the
woman about her decision not to attend college.71 They also question
whether she will feel comfortable serving on a board where most of the
directors have obtained college degrees.72 The woman responds, some-
what defensively, that she does not believe her past educational history is as
relevant as her professional experience and that she feels comfortable inter-
61. See id. at 973.
62. See id. at 975-76.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 957.
65. Id. at 974-79.





71. Flagg, supra note 54, at 974.
72. Id.
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acting with individuals with college degrees.73 The interview ends on a
tense note.74 The committee forwards the woman’s name to the full board
but notes that they found her to be “quite hostile.”75 They also conclude
that she might be disruptive at board meetings.76
Flagg argues that certain elements involved in the committee’s deci-
sion-making process reflect the transparency phenomenon.77 She notes
that the committee’s questions about the woman’s choices with regard to
education reflect White-specific norms: “Anyone smart enough to attend
college surely would do so, they might assume.”78 Flagg notes that this
assumption fails to consider the woman’s experience with inner-city
schools or the reasons for her decision to drop out of high school.79 The
assumption also fails to consider the cost-benefit analysis that the woman
may have engaged in when deciding whether she should go to college.
Flagg notes that the woman’s analysis of the costs and benefits of a college
education may have been quite accurate considering the success of her
business.80 Flagg argues that the committee failed to appreciate the
woman’s decision to fully devote herself to her business rather than divid-
ing her time between her college education and the business.81 Instead,
transparency theory caused the committee to judge the woman for failing
to follow their White educational norm.82 I believe that the woman’s fail-
ure to assimilate to the White educational norm played upon the commit-
tee members’ implicit biases against African-Americans and resulted in an
unspoken and possibly subconscious conclusion that she was less intelligent
than the college-educated White members of the Board. This subcon-
scious conclusion that the woman is less intelligent falls directly in line
with the long-held stereotype that African-Americans are intellectually in-
ferior to Whites.83
Flagg also notes that the committee’s description of the woman as
“hostile” is another reflection of the transparency theory.84 While the ad-
jective “hostile” appears to be race-neutral, Flagg argues that it is actually
race-specific because it rests upon certain race-specific norms concerning
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 975.
76. Flagg, supra note 54, at 975.
77. Id. at 975-76.




82. Flagg, supra note 54, at 976.
83. See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 322 (2012) (noting that
lower intelligence is a stereotype often applied to African-Americans).
84. Flagg, supra note 54, at 976.
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appropriate behavior.85 The term “hostile” implies that the woman’s be-
havior was somehow inappropriate, and such a determination reflects what
is appropriate based on a White experience.86 Flagg states that the com-
mittee members failed to recognize that the woman’s responses to their
questions may have been an appropriate response for an African-Ameri-
can, especially considering that she may have believed the committee
members’ questions were a reflection of their racial biases against African-
Americans.87 Because Whites do not contend with racial stereotypes on a
daily basis, the committee members did not understand the reason for the
woman’s so-called hostility.88 Again, I believe that the committee’s
description of the woman as “hostile” reflects baseline implicit bias as well
as the application of a common stereotype that Black women are angry,
confrontational, and disruptive.89
Flagg’s story is a helpful example of the effect that implicit bias, trans-
parency theory, and racial stereotypes can have on Whites’ decision-mak-
ing processes outside the context of the criminal justice system, but, in my
opinion, these theories and concepts also play out in the courtroom where
the stakes are much higher. First, social scientists have established that
White individuals who are chosen as jurors typically have some level of
implicit bias against African-Americans, regardless of whether the defen-
dant or the alleged victim is Black.90 We can also assume that the White
jurors, like others, are unaware that they hold such biases. Additionally, if
Flagg’s transparency phenomenon is accurate, we can assume that White
jurors will apply some White-specific norms and expectations to the Afri-
can-Americans involved in criminal cases and that they will do so under
the mistaken belief that the White-specific norms are reasonable and race-
neutral. Finally, we know that if the African-Americans involved in crimi-
nal cases fail to follow the White-specific norms imposed by White jurors,
then the jurors will make judgments about the African-Americans that not
only will reflect subconscious racial bias but also the application of certain
traditionally-held stereotypes of African-Americans.
I believe that the concepts of implicit bias and transparency theory,
when combined with the application of traditional racial stereotypes, come





89. See Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar
Treatment of African-American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
625, 633-41 (2000). Yarbrough and Bennett note several stereotypes that have traditionally been
attributed to African-American women, including Sapphire, who is described as “evil, bitchy,
stubborn and hateful.” Id. at 638. The Sapphire stereotype is known for her aggressiveness and
anger as well as her ability to emasculate men by engaging in verbal abuse. Id.
90. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
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criminal cases involving African-Americans. While the evidence is not ex-
plicitly introduced at trial, it is admitted nonetheless, and it has a real effect
on the outcome of criminal cases involving either an African-American
defendant or alleged victim. This evidence of stereotypical Blackness is
introduced to jurors outside the confines of Rule 404(a). Thus, courts are
not required to engage in any analysis of whether the prejudice associated
with the evidence, if any, might result in an unfair outcome. One recent
example of the use of stereotypical Blackness is the State v. George Zim-
merman trial, which concerned the death of 17-year-old Trayvon Mar-
tin.91 My hypothesis is that the doctrines of implicit bias and transparency
theory, together with the application of certain racial stereotypes, consti-
tuted affirmative evidence of Martin’s Blackness and ultimately became a
factor that favored the acquittal of George Zimmerman. In the next sec-
tion, I will discuss some of the evidence of stereotypical Blackness that was
admitted during the trial through the testimony of Rachel Jeantel and de-
scribe how that evidence likely affected the jury.
III. EVIDENCE OF STEREOTYPICAL BLACKNESS OFFERED DURING
THE STATE V. ZIMMERMAN TRIAL
On February 26, 2012, a 17-year-old African-American male named
Trayvon Martin and a 28-year-old Hispanic male named George Zimmer-
man, who were strangers to each other, became involved in a physical
altercation that resulted in the shooting death of Martin.92 The altercation
took place inside a gated community in Sanford, Florida.93 Zimmerman
was a resident of the neighborhood, and Martin was in the area to visit his
father, whose girlfriend lived in the neighborhood.94 Zimmerman claimed
that he shot Martin in self-defense, and, for the first six weeks following
Martin’s death, the Sanford Police Department chose not to charge Zim-
merman with a crime.95 However, following protests throughout the
country and significant media coverage, special prosecutor Angela Corey
announced that the State of Florida would charge Zimmerman with sec-
ond-degree murder.96
91. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Courts, State v. Zimmerman, No. 2012-CF-001083-A,
http://www.flcourts18.org/page.php?129 (media advisories and public record documents per-
taining to the trial) (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
92. Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race and




96. Sari Horwitz, Charge Filed in Martin Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1. Legal
scholars and others have suggested that Trayvon Martin’s race was a factor in the six-week lapse
between his death and the State’s decision to charge Zimmerman with a crime. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society,
91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2013) (“Race may have also influenced the government’s decision
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The trial of George Zimmerman took place in late June and early
July 2013.97 Many believed that the jury’s verdict would be a litmus test for
whether African-Americans could obtain fair outcomes in the American
criminal justice system.98 Would the six-person jury find Zimmerman’s
use of deadly force against an unarmed Black teenager unlawful?
Despite the widespread belief that the Zimmerman trial would serve
as some sort of commentary on race relations in America, the three-week
trial included very few overt references to race. During pre-trial motions
in limine, Zimmerman’s defense team convinced Judge Debra Nelson that
prosecutors should not be able to argue that Zimmerman racially profiled
Martin.99 Instead, prosecutors could only argue that Zimmerman “pro-
filed” Martin.100 During the presentation of the evidence, jurors heard
various 911 calls from Zimmerman wherein he described suspicious indi-
viduals as African-Americans but he did not do so pejoratively.101 Also,
during the cross-examination of prosecution witness Rachel Jeantel, Zim-
merman’s attorney questioned her on her and Martin’s use of the term
“cracker” to describe Caucasians.102 Finally, during the prosecution’s clos-
ing argument rebuttal, prosecutor John Guy stated that the case was not
about race and asked the jury to consider what the outcome of the trial
would be if Martin had shot and killed Zimmerman.103 Other than these
isolated references to race, the trial did not explicitly focus on whether
not to arrest Zimmerman. Had Zimmerman been an African American man who followed and
then shot an unarmed Caucasian teenager during a fist-fight, it is unlikely that police would have
released Zimmerman without any charges. When there is a dead victim and police know who
killed the victim, they usually arrest the obvious perpetrator of the homicide and then
investigate.”).
97. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Courts, State v. Zimmerman, No. 2012-CF-001083-A,
http://www.flcourts18.org/page.php?129 (media advisories and public record documents per-
taining to the trial) (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
98. See, e.g., Jenée Desmond-Harris, Zimmerman Trial: Race Verdict Already In, THEROOT
(July 11, 2013, 11:07 AM), available at http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2013/07/zim-
merman_trial_and_race_verdict_is_already_in.html (noting that “Zimmerman targeted Trayvon
because Trayvon was black.  If he walks, it means you can racially profile and get away with
murder.”); David Ovalle, Race Will Be Key in George Zimmerman Trial, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June
9, 2013), available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-will-be-key-in-
george-zimmerman-trial/2125775 (stating that “Zimmerman’s trial is shaping up to be a test of
both criminal justice and modern-day race relations.”).
99. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, George Zimmerman Trial: Race is a Subtext, Not the Focus,
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Martin’s race played any role in Zimmerman’s decision to use deadly force
against him.
A. Rachel Jeantel as an Example of Stereotypical Blackness
While the trial included very few explicit references to race, evi-
dence was offered at trial that would allow the jury to make certain infer-
ences about Martin’s character. This evidence of stereotypical Blackness
was offered through the direct and cross examinations of prosecution wit-
ness Rachel Jeantel. Jeantel’s testimony resulted in the admission of evi-
dence of stereotypical Blackness that likely harmed the prosecution’s case.
Jeantel was Martin’s friend and the last person to speak with him
before his death.104 Thus, Jeantel was a key prosecution witness because
she could provide insight into Martin’s state of mind immediately prior to
his physical altercation with Zimmerman. Jeantel was 19-years-old at the
time she testified and had just completed the eleventh grade.105 Described
as “a young woman, dark-skinned and overweight, her eyes signaling exas-
peration,”106 Jeantel was almost immediately attacked on social media for
her appearance, speech, and perceived level of intelligence.107 Twitter users
compared Jeantel to Precious, the title character in a 2009 feature film
detailing the life of a severely overweight, sexually abused, and illiterate
African-American girl portrayed by actress Gabourey Sidibe.108 Others,
including biracial Olympian Lolo Jones, compared Jeantel to the fictional
character Madea, an overweight, rambunctious, and stereotypically Black
woman portrayed by director, screenwriter, and actor Tyler Perry.109
Some Twitter users were downright cruel in their criticisms of Jeantel,
calling her dumb, stupid, uneducated, hideous, nasty, and stating that she
looked like a man.110 African-Americans tweeted that Jeantel was an em-
barrassment to the race and nothing more than a stereotypical Black
104. See Jelani Cobb, Rachel Jeantel on Trial, THE NEW YORKER (June 27, 2013) [hereinaf-




107. See Sherri Williams, Good, Bad and Ugly Tweets about Rachel Jeantel, BROWSE, https://
storify.com/SherriWrites/good-bad-and-ugly-tweets-about-rachel-jeantel (last visited Aug. 3,
2014).
108. Id.; see also Synopsis of Precious: Based on the Novel Push by Sapphire, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0929632/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
109. See Williams, supra note 107; see also Biography for Mable “Madea” Simmons from
Madea’s Family Reunion, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0018516/bio (last visited
Aug. 3, 2014) (describing Madea as “a tall (6’5”), overweight, older woman who uses the ‘mad
black woman’ stereotype”).
110. See Williams, supra note 107.
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woman.111 Indeed, one Twitter user described Jeantel as “the realest thug
walking.”112
The criticism of Jeantel by the “Twittersphere”113 is troubling not
only because the insults were so harsh but also because the tweets likely
provide some insight into the manner in which the Zimmerman jurors
viewed Jeantel and possibly Martin. The jurors, five White women and
one Puerto Rican woman, were properly charged with judging the verac-
ity of Jeantel’s testimony, but, as Martin’s friend and the last person to
speak with him prior to his death, Jeantel became Martin’s proxy. She was
the only person who could describe the night’s events from Martin’s per-
spective. Jurors likely assumed that Martin and Jeantel were of similar char-
acter since they were friends. To the extent the jurors made assessments of
Jeantel’s character, they may have also believed that Martin possessed some
of the same character traits. Thus, the evidence of stereotypical Blackness
offered through Jeantel became evidence of Martin’s character.
Jeantel was an overweight Black woman who appeared to have had
some irregularity in her education based on her entering twelfth grade at
the age of 19. The jurors may have assumed that she had been held back in
school and probably perceived her as uneducated or unintelligent. Also,
they probably found her demeanor in response to direct and cross exami-
nation questioning to be hostile and uncooperative.114 Jeantel also strug-
gled to read the transcript of her deposition testimony, which defense
counsel provided to her during cross-examination, and she later admitted
that she had some literacy difficulties.115 Additionally, she testified that she
and Martin sometimes referred to White people as “crackers”116 and that
Martin referred to Zimmerman as a “creepy-ass cracker” on the night of
the shooting.117 Social media was set ablaze with criticism of Jeantel for
being stereotypically Black—uneducated, hostile, inarticulate, angry to-
ward Whites, lazy, and a thug—and it is possible that the jurors made
similar assessments about Martin’s character.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. “Twittersphere” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “[p]ostings made on
the social media website Twitter, considered collectively.” Definition of Twittersphere, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Twitter
sphere (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
114. See Rachel Jeantel on Trial, supra note 104 (stating that Jeantel’s “appearance, diction,
size and intelligence were an unspoken but all-encompassing part of the proceedings” and
describing her as irritable, reluctant, and antagonistic).
115. Id.
116. Gene Demby, The Secret History of the Word “Cracker” (July 1, 2013), NPR, available
at http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/01/197644761/word-watch-on-crackers
(noting that the term “cracker” is a pejorative term for “bigoted white folks”).
117. See Rachel Jeantel on Trial, supra note 104.
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If it is true that Jeantel’s stereotypical Blackness took on the role of
character evidence against Martin, then the prosecution’s case as presented
was unwinnable. The prosecution failed to offer any evidence that might
humanize Martin in the eyes of the jury. While the prosecution played
multiple audio and video recordings of Zimmerman, including his 911
calls and interviews with investigators following the shooting of Martin,
they were unable to offer any evidence of Martin’s recorded voice.118 Not
only were prosecutors unable to show Martin as a complex human being
who may have had a legitimate fear that his life was in danger, but they did
little to prevent the jury from inferring that Jeantel’s stereotypical Black-
ness was also probative of Martin’s character. If the jury believed that Mar-
tin was uneducated, hostile, inarticulate, angry toward Whites, lazy, and a
thug (characteristics that are consistent with many traditional stereotypes of
African-Americans), then they could quite easily determine that Martin
acted in conformity with his stereotypical Blackness on the night in
question.
B. The Jurors’ Reactions to Jeantel
We need not speculate regarding the impact that Jeantel had on the
jurors’ perceptions of Martin. An interview with the juror known only as
B-37 reveals that Jeantel’s failure to present herself in accordance with
White-specific norms very likely influenced Juror B-37’s assessment of the
characters of both Jeantel and Martin.119
1. Juror B-37’s Background
Before we explore Juror B-37’s post-trial interview, it is helpful to
review her responses to the attorneys’ voir dire questions. Juror B-37 was a
White, middle-aged mother of two who resided in Seminole County,
Florida, at the time of the trial.120 During voir dire questioning, Juror B-
37 stated that she was aware that riots had occurred following the death of
Martin, when, in reality, no riots had occurred.121 She also stated that,
other than the Today show, she does not watch the news and finds the
118. See Lizette Alvarez, Trayvon Martin’s Father Says Screams on 911 Call Were His Son’s,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/us/friends-test
ify-that-zimmerman-is-the-one-screaming-for-help-on-911-call.html?_r=0 (The prosecution’s
failure to introduce evidence of Martin’s voice also hurt their case in another key area. Because
the jurors never heard Martin’s voice, they could make no assessment as to whether he was the
person heard screaming on the 911 calls that were made on the night of his death.).
119. See Dan Zak, Who is Juror B-37? Our Sole Window – for now - Into the Zimmerman




121. See Hamilton Nolan, Juror B-37 Hates Media, Calls Martin “Boy of Color”, GAWKER
(July 15, 2013), available at http://gawker.com/george-zimmerman-juror-b37-hates-media-
called-trayvon-787873533.
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media to be worthless.122 When asked by Zimmerman’s attorneys to de-
scribe Martin, she stated that “[h]e was a boy of color” and, when refer-
ring to Martin’s death, she called it “an unfortunate incident that
happened.”123
Juror B-37’s statements support my opinion that she entered the jury
box with certain implicit biases against African-Americans. She mistakenly
believed that the individuals protesting the Sanford Police Department’s
failure to arrest Zimmerman had engaged in riots and likely believed that
African-Americans had carried out those riots.124 Juror B-37 also chose to
describe Martin by his sex and color when she could have used many other
words to describe him. Martin’s sex and color were his most salient charac-
teristics in the eyes of Juror B-37, but I suspect that she would not have
mentioned Zimmerman’s race if asked to describe him.125 Juror B-37’s
description of Martin is a clear example of Flagg’s transparency theory.126
While Juror B-37’s voir dire responses should have raised some red flags for
the prosecution, they did not use one of their peremptory strikes to re-
move her from the jury.
2. Juror B-37’s Anderson Cooper Interview
Just two days after the announcement of Zimmerman’s acquittal, Ju-
ror B-37 sat for an interview with Anderson Cooper.127 Juror B-37 con-
cealed her identity during the interview to avoid bringing attention to her
family.128 During the interview, Cooper asked Juror B-37 a series of ques-
tions about Jeantel:
COOPER: I want to ask you a bunch of the—I want to ask
you about some of the different witnesses. Rachel Jeantel, the
woman who was on the phone with Trayvon Martin at the start
of the incident. What did you make of her testimony?
JUROR: I didn’t think it was very credible, but I felt very sorry
for her. She didn’t ask to be in this place. She didn’t ask—she
wanted to go. She wanted to leave. She didn’t want to be any




125. It is more likely that Juror B-37 would have identified Zimmerman by his national
origin of Hispanic because his national origin differs from Juror B-37’s transparent national
origin.
126. See supra Section II.B.
127. See Anderson Cooper, 360 Degrees, Excerpts of Interview with Juror B-37 (Part I),
CNN (July 15, 2013), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/15/acd.
01.html.
128. Id.
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because of her education and her communication skills. I just
felt sadness for her.
COOPER: You felt like, what, she was in over her head?
JUROR: Well, not over her head, she just didn’t want to be
there, and she was embarrassed by being there, because of her
education and her communication skills, that she just wasn’t a
good witness.129
Juror B-37’s description of Jeantel is extremely telling. First, she
stated that Jeantel was not a credible witness but did not immediately ex-
plain her reasons for this conclusion. Instead, she discussed Jeantel’s “inad-
equate” education and communication skills and stated, in a paternalistic
fashion, that she felt pity for Jeantel.130 Juror B-37 perceived that Jeantel
was embarrassed because her inadequacies were exposed for the world to
see.131 Juror B-37 also concluded that Jeantel’s lack of education and poor
communication skills made her a bad witness for the prosecution.132
Juror B-37’s perception of Jeantel was obviously affected by certain
widely held racial stereotypes of African-Americans. First, Juror B-37 con-
cluded that Jeantel’s education and communication skills were inadequate
without considering Jeantel’s testimony that she was born in Haiti and had
the ability to speak two other languages in addition to English.133 While
Jeantel also revealed her struggle with literacy during her testimony, Juror
B-37 did not conclude that those struggles might be due to the fact that
English was not the primary language spoken in Jeantel’s home.134 Juror
B-37’s assumption that Jeantel’s speech and reading skills were the result of
poor education or a lack of intelligence demonstrate the application of
White-specific and American-specific expectations that all people living in
the United States must be able to speak and read English, unless they are
too unintelligent to do so.
Juror B-37’s interview with Cooper also revealed that she had trouble
relating to both Jeantel and Martin, providing a clue that her assessment of
Jeantel’s character also became her assessment of Martin’s character:
COOPER: Did you find it hard at times to understand what
[Jeantel] was saying?
JUROR: A lot of the times because a lot of the time she was
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COOPER: When she used the phrase, “creepy ass cracker,”
what did you think of that?
JUROR: I thought it was probably the truth. I think Trayvon
probably said that.
COOPER: And did you see that as a negative statement or a
racial statement as the defense suggested?
JUROR: I don’t think it’s really racial. I think it’s just everyday
life, the type of life that they live, and how they’re living, in the
environment that they’re living in.135
Juror B-37 did not find Jeantel to be a credible witness in general, but
had no trouble believing her testimony that Martin called Zimmerman a
“creepy-ass cracker.”136 Juror B-37 indicated that she had a hard time un-
derstanding Jeantel’s vernacular but concluded that the everyday lives of
Martin and Jeantel involved them using pejorative terms to describe
Whites. She made judgments and assumptions about the environment in
which Martin and Jeantel lived, even though no witnesses offered testi-
mony on this topic. Juror B-37’s statements reveal a divide between the
suburban lives of Juror B-37 and Zimmerman on the one hand, and the
“ghetto” inner-city lives of Jeantel and Martin on the other. Importantly,
Juror B-37’s statements also reveal that she made certain judgments about
Martin’s character based on her assessment of his proxy Jeantel.
Compare Juror B-37’s failure to identify with Jeantel and Martin
with her glowing and very personal description of Zimmerman. Juror B-
37 stated that Zimmerman’s “heart was in the right place” but that his
good intentions got displaced because of the crime occurring in his neigh-
borhood.137 In that regard, the defense offered evidence that African-
American men were responsible for a lot of the crime that had occurred in
Zimmerman’s neighborhood.138 In his closing argument, Zimmerman’s
defense attorney, Mark O’Mara, argued that Zimmerman had reason to be
suspicious of Martin because he fit the description of the individuals who
had committed crimes in Zimmerman’s neighborhood in the past.139 Juror
B-37 also stated that, despite some inconsistencies in the statements Zim-
merman made to investigators, she believed his account of what happened
on the night he shot Martin.140 Juror B-37 concluded that Martin “got
mad and attacked” Zimmerman, and she described Martin as the “aggres-
135. Excerpts of Interview with Juror B-37 (Part I), supra note 127.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Jelani Cobb, What the Zimmerman Trial Was About, THE NEW YORKER (July 12,
2013), available at www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-zimmerman-trial-was-
about.
139. Id.
140. See Excerpts of Interview with Juror B-37 (Part I), supra note 127.
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sor.”141 She also stated that she believed Martin may have reached for
Zimmerman’s gun even though the defense offered no DNA evidence to
support this belief.142 Finally, Juror B-37 stated that she would feel com-
fortable having Zimmerman patrol her neighborhood and that she be-
lieved he would be very responsible with his gun.143
Juror B-37 was just one of the six individuals who voted to acquit
Zimmerman, and four  of the remaining five jurors have disavowed her
comments, stating that they do not share the opinions she expressed during
her Anderson Cooper interview.144 Even if the other jurors (four White
females and one Puerto Rican female) did not harbor biases similar to
those demonstrated by Juror B-37, it is fair to say that, as to Juror B-37, the
concepts of implicit bias and transparency theory as well as the application
of certain racial stereotypes took on the role of character evidence and
provided Juror B-37 with enough information to make assessments about
Martin that resulted in her decision to vote for Zimmerman’s acquittal.
I believe that this evidence of stereotypical Blackness is admitted in
most criminal cases involving African-American defendants or victims, but
it does not receive the same scrutiny that overt, explicit propensity evi-
dence would receive before being presented to the jury. For this reason,
judges in criminal trials must make an effort to limit the impact of evi-
dence of stereotypical Blackness.
IV. REDUCING OR ELIMINATING THE IMPACT OF EVIDENCE OF
STEREOTYPICAL BLACKNESS
This section will explore various options for lessening the impact of
evidence of stereotypical Blackness. Because this evidence can find its ori-
gins in the concepts of implicit bias and transparency theory, one might
believe that it is nearly impossible to reduce or eliminate its impact because
it exists on a subconscious level; however, social science research suggests
that certain strategies can result in a reduction in implicit bias.145 When
these strategies are considered along with traditional evidentiary tools for
limiting the impact of unfairly prejudicial evidence, a set of potential solu-
tions emerges.
A. Jury Selection
During the jury selection process, it is common for the attorneys or




144. See Carolyn Pesce, 4 Zimmerman Jurors: B-37 Doesn’t Speak for Us, USA TODAY (July
17, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/17/zimmerman-
jurors-issue-statement/2523893/.
145. See discussion infra Section IV.A-B.
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assessment of the evidence. This inquiry is completely ineffective in deter-
mining whether a given juror can set aside his or her implicit biases since
the jurors are likely not even aware that they harbor certain implicit bi-
ases.146 Similarly, White jurors are not likely to acknowledge the tendency
of Whites to apply White-specific norms to people of color because those
norms usually appear to be race-neutral. The point here is that the normal
voir dire examination process is not sufficient to ferret out jurors who are
likely to make decisions based on evidence of stereotypical Blackness.
On the other hand, research shows that racial diversity can signifi-
cantly reduce the likelihood that implicit bias will affect jury verdicts.147
Professors Jolls and Sunstein have summarized several social science studies
which “support[ ] the conclusion that the presence of population diversity
in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias.”148 They note
one study wherein White IAT test-takers who were paired with African-
American partners exhibited less implicit bias than White test-takers paired
with White partners.149
While racial diversity among jurors may reduce bias, the racial make-
up of the voter rolls in counties like Seminole County, Florida, may not
allow for racially diverse juries. Thus, judges must employ other strategies
to eliminate the effect of stereotype evidence.
B. Instruction from the Court
One method for reducing the effect of implicit bias, transparency
theory, and racial stereotypes may be to simply talk about these concepts
with the jury and encourage them to resist the urge to allow these phe-
nomena to affect their assessment of the evidence. Rather than ignoring
the 10,000-pound pink elephant in the courtroom that is race in the
American criminal justice system, it may be quite effective to educate ju-
rors on the existence of implicit bias and transparency theory and caution
them against allowing racial stereotypes to influence their decisions in any
way. Judge Bennett argues that courts should instruct jurors that most peo-
ple hold certain biases and urge jurors to control their biases while serving
on the jury.150 To support this view, Bennett cites to research studies of
police officers showing a statistically significant decrease in implicit bias
146. See White Juror Bias, supra note 50, at 222 (“Due to racial norms in contemporary
America, modern racism is often expressed in subtle ways and prejudicial thoughts often linger
outside Whites’ conscious awareness. As a result, when asked about their ability to remain race-
neutral, few White Americans admit to harboring anti-Black sentiment. Some potential jurors
may intentionally lie in order to avoid appearing prejudiced. Others may truly believe they are
impartial.”).
147. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969,
981 (2006).
148. Id.
149. Id. (summarizing studies).
150. See Bennett, supra note 33, at 169.
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following training.151 Judge Bennett is an innovator in the area of juror
education on the topic of bias. In both civil and criminal trials, he instructs
jurors on implicit bias just prior to opening statements. He also requires
jurors in his criminal cases to sign a certificate of nondiscrimination.152
Because the premise of this paper is that stereotypical Blackness takes on
the role of propensity evidence in criminal cases involving African-Ameri-
cans, it would also be appropriate and necessary for the court to provide a
limiting instruction to the jurors cautioning them to avoid using such evi-
dence to make inferences about the character traits of the defendant or
alleged victim.153
In the Zimmerman case, the court limited the discussion of race dur-
ing the trial;154 however, according to Sommers and Ellsworth, the court
would have reduced juror bias by allowing some discussion of race during
the trial.155 They argue that allowing the discussion of race at trial will
remind White jurors of their egalitarian ideals and desire to appear non-
prejudiced, thereby ensuring a non-biased verdict.156 One might argue
that race was salient at the Zimmerman trial because the national media
coverage focused on the trial as a microcosm of race relations in America,
but I believe the jury failed to consider or openly discuss race during jury
deliberations because the court and attorneys made clear that the case was
not about race. Because the trial was whitewashed in this way, jurors likely
believed they would be breaking the rules if they had engaged an open
discussion about race.
C. Rebuttal Evidence
The most effective way to combat traditional character evidence,
short of excluding it altogether, is to rebut the evidence. If Jeantel’s testi-
mony in the Zimmerman case resulted in a portrayal of Trayvon Martin as
an uneducated, hostile, inarticulate, lazy thug who disliked Whites,157
then the prosecution should have been able to rebut this evidence.
151. Id. at 156, 169; see also Seeing Through Colorblindness, supra note 39, at 500 (“[B]eing
aware of potential biases, being motivated to check those biases, and being accountable to a
superior (as a jury feels toward a judge) should have some effect on the translation of bias to
behavior.”).
152. See Bennett, supra note 33, at 169.
153. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 would allow for such an instruction. See FED. R. EVID.
105.
154. See supra Section III.
155. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
156. See White Juror Bias, supra note 50, at 222-23. Indeed, Sommers and Ellsworth advise
the attorneys of Black defendants to “play the race card” in an effort to remind jurors of the
discriminatory treatment that exists at every level of the criminal justice system. Id.
157. See supra Section III.A.
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Florida’s rule of the admissibility of character evidence is very similar
to Federal Rule of Evidence 404.158 It provides that a criminal defendant
may offer evidence of a pertinent character trait of the alleged victim and
that the prosecution may rebut such evidence.159 In the Zimmerman trial,
the defense did not offer explicit evidence of Martin’s character for vio-
lence. Doing so would have been quite risky for Zimmerman, who had
been arrested and charged with felony battery and resisting arrest and who
was accused of domestic violence in 2005.160 Had Zimmerman introduced
explicit evidence of Martin’s character for violence, he likely would have
opened the door for the prosecution to offer reputation testimony regard-
ing Zimmerman’s character for violence.161 Rather than offering explicit
character evidence, Zimmerman’s defense team was able to bring out evi-
dence of Jeantel’s character traits, many of which were not pertinent to
Jeantel’s credibility, and link those traits to Martin. This approach insulated
Zimmerman from the risk that his reputation for violence might be admit-
ted in rebuttal.
The more appropriate rule would be to allow rebuttal evidence
where the jury hears evidence of an individual’s stereotypical Blackness. In
the Zimmerman trial, that rebuttal evidence would not have focused on
attacking Zimmerman’s character but instead on humanizing Martin.
Under the current version of Florida’s Rule 404, the prosecution could
have offered evidence of Martin’s character for peacefulness, but it made a
strategic decision not to do so to avoid opening the door to evidence sug-
gesting that Martin had engaged in violence in the past.162 Thus, rather
than focusing on Martin’s propensity for violence, the evidence rebutting
the stereotype evidence would focus on Martin’s general demeanor, lifes-
tyle, and attitude toward Whites. For example, had the prosecution been
able to introduce video evidence of Martin speaking or interacting with
his family or friends, then he would have been on equal footing with Zim-
merman, who spoke to the jury through several video and audio record-
ings. Also, to combat the notion that Martin did not like Whites and
exhibited hostility toward them, the prosecution would offer evidence that
Martin was friendly with people of all races and may have had very close
158. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(1)(b) (West 2014).
159. Id.
160. See MSNBC.com Staff, Zimmerman Accused of Domestic Violence, Fighting with a Police
Officer, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/
27/10894561-zimmerman-accused-of-domestic-violence-fighting-with-a-police-officer.
161. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.405 (stating that, where character evidence is admissible, it
must be offered through reputation testimony on direct examination while specific instances may
only be brought out on cross-examination).
162. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(1)(b)(2); see also Tracy Connor, Jury’s Look into Trayvon
Martin’s Past Has its Limits, NBC NEWS (June 7, 2013), available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/
_news/2013/06/07/18832092-jurys-look-into-trayvon-martins-past-has-its-limits?lite (noting
that the trial judge excluded evidence of Martin’s past fights and text messages referencing guns).
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friends who were White. Evidence of Martin’s plan to attend college or
efforts to find employment would combat the notion that he was a thug.
Finally, evidence of Martin’s good performance in school would combat
the stereotype that he was unintelligent and lazy.
Each of these suggestions assumes that Martin exhibited these traits.
If Martin displayed at least some of these characteristics during his short
lifetime, it is unfortunate that the jury never had an opportunity to get to
know him. Although many different factors resulted in the acquittal of
George Zimmerman, I believe that this rebuttal evidence would have
given the jury a more well-rounded picture of the voiceless Trayvon
Martin.
Empirical research supports this approach to attacking stereotype evi-
dence.163 Melinda Jones has found that providing information to the jury
that contradicts racial stereotypes is very effective in preventing the appli-
cation of the stereotype.164 Jones found that “counterstereotypical infor-
mation that was highly relevant to the judgment (for example, describing a
Hispanic defendant accused of an aggressive crime as nonaggressive via
character testimony) was effective in eliminating stereotypic biases.”165
Thus, in the Zimmerman case, prosecutors could have reduced the possi-
bility that jurors would rely upon stereotyped biases of Martin by offering
counterstereotypical character evidence to the extent they could do so
within the confines of the Florida Rules of Evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The Zimmerman trial is just one example of a phenomenon that
likely happens quite frequently, often without the benefit of a public trial.
We will never know the extent to which evidence of stereotypical Black-
ness affected the grand juries investigating the deaths of Michael Brown,166
Eric Garner,167 and John Crawford.168 What we do know is that following
George Zimmerman’s acquittal, he has been involved in several incidents
163. See Melinda Jones, Preventing the Application of Stereotypic Biases in the Courtroom: The
Role of Detailed Testimony, 20 J. OF APP. SOC. PSY. 1767 (1997) (analyzing methods for prevent-
ing the application of stereotypic biases in jury decision-making).
164. Id. at 1768-69.
165. Id. at 1769.
166. See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Grand Jury Declines to Indict Police Officer in Fergu-
son Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A1.
167. See Larry Celona, Kirstan Conley & Bruce Golding, Cop Cleared in Chokehold Death of
Eric Garner, N.Y. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://nypost.com/2014/12/03/cop-cleared-
in-eric-garner-chokehold-death/.
168. See Mark Berman, No Indictment after Police Shoot and Kill Man at Ohio Wal-Mart;
Justice Dep’t launches investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/24/no-indictments-after-police-shoot-and-kill-
man-at-an-ohio-wal-mart-justice-dept-launches-investigation/.
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that call into question Juror B-37’s assessment of him as a peaceful, respon-
sible gun owner whose “heart was in the right place.”169
African-Americans must frequently confront biases and stereotypes.
These biases and prejudices certainly exist outside the context of criminal
cases, but evidence of stereotypical Blackness takes on greater significance
when an African-American is either a silent victim or a defendant exercis-
ing his or her constitutional right to remain silent. The strategies outlined
above, which include empaneling more diverse juries, educating and in-
structing jurors on the risk of bias, and offering explicit evidence to rebut
unspoken but pervasive racial stereotypes, may move us toward verdicts
that are a better reflection of the evidence presented rather than a product
of our implicit prejudices and misconceptions about people who are differ-
ent from us. It is the writer’s hope that these practices will move us toward
a more perfect criminal justice system that will treat all Americans equally
regardless of their skin color.
169. See Greg Botelho & Carma Hassan, George Zimmerman Arrested on Suspected Domestic
Violence, CNN (Jan. 13, 2015), available at http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/10/us/george-zim
merman-arrested/ (noting that Zimmerman has had two arrests for domestic violence and had
been accused of making criminal threats since his acquittal in 2013).
